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Epistemology, methodology or philosophy of science, i.e., the foundations and validity of 
knowledge, have never been very popular subjects as applied to management research. Lately, 
though, the need for better theories and the methodological discussion underlying the creation 
of such theories appears to be receiving more attention. In this paper, I will review some basic 
underlying issues in the area by taking a look at to some of the classical authors. 
I will first analyze Hayek’s view of methodological problems in economics and then apply his 
analysis to the development of management theory. Then, I’ll elaborate on Elster’s distinction 
between causal, functional and intentional explanations. Naïve methodological attitudes will be 
discussed in this context. I will use agency theory as an example of what should and should not 
be done. Finally, I’ll examine the falsification criterion in management theory and discuss the 
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Epistemology, methodology and the philosophy of science, i.e., the foundations and validity of 
knowledge, have never been very popular subjects among management researchers. In the last 
forty years or so, some empirical research methods have come to be accepted (with or without 
strong methodological or epistemological foundations, as we will see) and management 
research has developed using these methods. Implicitly, in fact, they have become the standard 
of scientific acceptance and thus the implicit epistemology behind this research: anything 
empirical that uses accepted methods is considered scientific, whereas what is not empirical is 
considered highly doubtful. However, no philosopher of science would ever accept this view. 
The ‘demarcation principle’, to use Popper’s well-known expression to separate the scientific 
from the unscientific (or the a-scientific), should be a substantially different one. 
In some fields of management, this process has taken place more explicitly than in others. In 
accounting, for instance, there have been explicit discussions about whether research should be 
‘normative’ (as it was by and large before the 1960s) or ‘positive’ (meaning essentially 
empirical) like it is for the most part now. ‘Positive’ is now considered to be ‘scientific’, while 
‘normative’ has come to mean ‘unscientific’ (see Christenson, 1983, for a critical analysis of 
these issues). In other fields, the discussion may be less clear, but in practically all of them there 
is some concern about management research being ‘too formal’ and irrelevant for practice, and 
this has prompted some to doubt whether management can possibly be a science (e.g., Eccles 
and Nohria, 1992). 
Yet the need for better theories and the methodological discussion underlying the creation 
of such theories has lately received increasing attention. Smith and Hitt (2005) recently 
edited a collection on the process of theory building with contributions from many of the 
best-known scholars, mostly in the fields of general management and organization 
behavior. In his posthumous article that will likely be his most influential contribution, 
Ghoshal (2005) raised the methodological issue as a crucial point in the development of 
‘bad management theories’. In her 2005 Presidential Address to the Academy of 
Management, Rousseau advocated for ‘evidence-based management’, i.e., “translating 
principles based on the best evidence into organizational practices” (Rousseau, 2006).  
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Although her analysis is not focused on methodological issues, it is obvious that for 
something to be considered “evidence-based,” there has to be a criterion of acceptance of 
what ‘evidence’ is, a methodological point that at least partly underlies Learmonth’s 
commentary on Rousseau’s Address. (Learmonth, 2006). Van de Ven and Johnson (2006) 
and McKelvey (2006) discuss the gap between theory and practice and acknowledge the 
methodological issues involved in getting knowledge from practice and research dating at 
least as far back as Aristotle. 
In this paper, I will critically examine the basic epistemological issues in management research 
in an attempt to clarify some essential concepts. I will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss 
whether management can be considered a science and answer affirmatively by differentiating 
between ‘science’ and ‘scientism’. Next, I will review Hayek’s analysis of the essential 
methodological problems in economics and then apply his analysis to the development of 
management theory. Elaborate on Elster’s distinction between causal, functional and intentional 
explanations to show that only intentional explanations are valid in the context of 
management research. Also attempt to show how naïve methodological attitudes can cause 
scientific developments to deviate from their proper ends. Agency theory, one of the most 
widely used models in management and economics, will provide an example of what should 
and should not be done. Finally, compare the falsification criterion with methodological 
problems in management theory and discuss the role of mathematics in the development of this 
theory. 
Science and Scientism in Management 
The first question is whether management can be considered a science. This question has been 
asked since the beginning of management theory about a century ago, and has been answered 
affirmatively by almost all the classical writers who have explicitly asked the question, and by 
many others who have asked it implicitly. For instance, Taylor made up the expression 
‘scientific management.’ Somewhat more explicitly, Fayol’s main purpose was to come up with 
a theory that could be taught to would-be managers. The question has been touched on in 
different degrees by many other classical authors writing on management. Mary Parker Follet 
uses excellent explicit arguments (Follet, 1927): 
“Science has been defined as ‘knowledge gained by systematic observation, experiment 
and reasoning; knowledge coordinated, arranged and systematized.’ Can we not 
accumulate in regard to human relations knowledge gained by systematic observation, 
experiment and reasoning? Can we not coordinate, arrange, and systematize that 
knowledge? I think we can” (p. 12 in the Matteson and Ivancevich edition). 
Later on, Luther Gulick also answered the question affirmatively on slightly different grounds 
in a well-known article in the Academy of Management whose title is categorical: Management 
is a Science (Gulick, 1965): 
“When a field of knowledge has been defined, made ‘public’, pursued for some time, 
organized into an elaborate system of explicit primary and secondary theories, which 
have been or are being tested by logic and by the realities of the universe, so that past 
and current changes in the system can be explained and future changes predicted or 
produced, we call this ball of knowledge a science” (p. 10).  
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Gulick believed that management was one of these balls of knowledge. However, he 
acknowledged that at different points in time, certain sciences had developed at different rates, 
and that management had been lagging behind other sciences for quite some time. But for him 
it was just a matter of time. 
Neither Luther Gulick nor Mary Parker Follet went into an in-depth methodological analysis, 
but their arguments are very similar to those of Christenson, who does perform such analysis. 
By criticizing as too ambitious the objective of science, often assumed by many researchers of 
‘explaining’ observed phenomena, he proposes a more modest objective of rationalizing a 
language (that of a particular science), which in fact means making it logically consistent, and 
applying this rationalized language to the description of empirical phenomena (Christenson, 
1973, 1976, 1983). Einstein agrees: “The object of all science, whether natural science or 
psychology, is to coordinate our experiences and to bring them into a logical system” (1956). 
In summary, management is (or, in the worst-case scenario, can become) a science. One has to 
be careful, though, not to fall into scientism, which, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica is 
“an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of 
investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences and the humanities).” 
Hayek was possibly one of the first economists to accuse the social sciences in general and 
economics in particular of ‘scientism’. In his well-known book The Counter-Revolution of 
Science (1952), he strongly criticized economics when it imitated the methods of the natural 
sciences instead of the spirit of these sciences, and called this imitation a ‘tyranny’. According 
to Hayek, this tyranny came from the fact that, during the first half of the 19
th century, the 
word ‘science’ was increasingly applied only to the natural sciences, while claiming at the same 
time a special righteousness and certainty. One might add that this righteousness and certainty 
were later proven wrong, thus making the scientistic attitude doubly wrong: because of the 
methods and the (false) certainties. 
Hayek later made the subject one of the main points in his Nobel Lecture (1974): 
“...failure of the economists to guide policy more successfully is closely connected with 
their propensity to imitate as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly 
successful physical sciences - an attempt which in our field may lead to outright error. It 
is an approach which has come to be described as the ‘scientistic’ attitude - an attitude 
which, as I defined it some thirty years ago, ‘is decidedly unscientific in the true sense of 
the word, since it involves a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to 
fields different from those in which they have been formed.’ (...) Unlike the position that 
exists in the physical sciences, in economics and other disciplines that deal with 
essentially complex phenomena, the aspects of the events to be accounted for about 
which we can get quantitative data are necessarily limited and may not include the 
important ones.” (1974) 
Consequently, if we understand that ‘science’ means some body of knowledge that imitates the 
methods and type of results of the physical sciences in terms of clear-cut, causal explanations 
or perhaps the functional explanations of the biological sciences (see below), then management 
cannot be a science: ‘intentions’ (implicitly assumed away in these kinds of explanations) are a 
crucial part of interactions between people. Interestingly, it is this ‘scientistic’ approach that is 
(perhaps unknowingly and unwillingly) behind many criticisms of the notion that management 
is a science. Eccles and Nohria, who are among the modern critics of this possibility, argue 
(1992, p.175) against the applicability of scientific research to management and state that “the  
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validity of formal
1 research is judged by criteria that attempt to define good ‘scientific’ 
research, such as statistical significance, replicability and predictive power.” Indeed, these may 
be the criteria to evaluate the methods of the natural sciences. But if, following Hayek’s line of 
thought, the social sciences do not imitate the methods, but the spirit of the natural sciences, 
then one has to go beyond these criteria, as we shall see. If this is done, then management 
should be and already is a science, as Gulick stated in the title of his article. It therefore 
becomes crucial to establish the methodological bases of this science. 
Epistemological Problems in Economics 
Hayek’s strong methodological critique in The Counter-Revolution of Science was directed in 
general at the social sciences and placed special emphasis on his negative opinion of the 
‘engineering point of view’ exemplified by Saint-Simon. Though the spirit of the critique 
remained the same, Hayek applied it more specifically in his Nobel Lecture to macroeconomic 
problems, mainly to the statistical relationships between inflation, massive unemployment and 
aggregate output, i.e., to big aggregate variables for which it is often thought that statistics are 
enough. Hayek’s main point is that this is not so. Following is a summary of Hayek’s crucial 
points to show how he emphasizes in economics what I have just considered a distinct feature 
of management: 
1)  Data in the social sciences are subjective. Social sciences deal with the relations 
between people and things and between people, and different people react differently to 
identical stimuli at different times and under different circumstances. ‘Opinions’ held by 
observed individuals are ‘facts’ in the social sciences. 
2)  The purpose of the individual is crucial; and the unintended or undesigned 
consequences of the actions of many people are part of what has to be explained. 
Things are what acting people think they are: a ‘tool’ or an ‘instrument’ cannot be 
defined without mentioning purpose or intention. 
3)  In the social sciences, we have to deal with structures of essential complexity, i.e., 
structures whose characteristic properties can be exhibited only by models made up of 
relatively large numbers of variables. The properties usually attributed to competition 
(efficiency, etc.) will apply only if the number of agents is ‘fairly large’. This happens to 
some extent in biology as well, but not so much in the physical sciences. 
4)  In the physical sciences, in some very complex problems affecting a high number of 
variables, the difficulties may be overcome by using data about probabilities instead of 
information about individual elements. These are phenomena of ‘unorganized 
complexity’. However, this cannot be done in social systems: “...organized complexity 
means that the character of the structures showing it depends, not only on the 
properties of the individual elements of which they are composed and the relative 
frequency with which they occur, but also on the manner in which the individual 
elements are connected each other.” (Hayek, 1974). To make things even more complex, 
the people affected by these organized complexity phenomena learn, i.e., change their 
                                              
1 By ‘formal,’ they presumably mean ‘methodical’, ‘conventional’, ‘organized’ research, not research that is structured 
in logico-mathematical language. Notice that they refer exclusively to empirical research.  
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beliefs and preferences in the process, which inevitably leads to a change in their 
intentions and their purposes. 
5)  “While in the physical sciences it is generally assumed, probably with good reason, that 
any important factor which determines the observed events will itself be directly 
observable and measurable, in the study of such complex phenomena as the market, 
which depend on the actions of many individuals, all the circumstances which will 
determine the outcome of a process, for reasons which I will explain later, will hardly 
ever be fully known or measurable. And while in the physical sciences the investigator 
will be able to measure what, on the basis of a prima facie theory, he thinks important, 
in the social sciences often what is treated as important happens to be accessible to 
measurement. This is sometimes carried to the point where it is demanded that our 
theories must be formulated in such terms that they refer only to measurable 
magnitudes” (1974).
2 
His arguments are even more applicable to research in the field of management. If there is a 
difference between management and economics, i t  i s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  h a s  t o  d o  w i t h  
particular situations, specific people, problems of communication between people, and so on; 
while economics has to do with bigger aggregates and more quantitative variables. 
Epistemological Problems in Management 
As mentioned above, Hayek’s analysis focuses on the social sciences in general, but is 
possibly more specifically directed towards the behavior of people in aggregate form, i.e., 
when ‘markets’ are the form of coordination of individual actions. But, as stated above, his 
points are even more applicable to organizations, which are the alternative form of 
coordinating human activity. In fact, the assumptions of economics (mainly, utility theory), 
extremely simplified in terms of individual motives and preferences and, thus, admittedly 
unrealistic from the point of view of the actual description of human behavior, are often 
justified from an aggregate point of view: even if all individuals do not behave exactly 
according to the postulates of such a theory, statistically speaking the results may be ‘as if’ 
they did. But this argument cannot be used to defend such postulates when what is at stake is 
one specific decision by an individual, regardless of whether that individual acts as a 
consumer or a producer, i.e., when we are trying to derive rules or guidelines for specific 
decision-making activities, which is the main objective of management theory. 
A distinction established by Elster (1983) and applied to management by Ghoshal (2006) 
becomes quite important in this context. According to the Hayek view expressed above, the 
social sciences should (in general) use methods that are different from those used by the natural 
sciences. Hence, one might be tempted to distinguish between different kinds of science 
according to the specific methods of inquiry used in each one. In this view, the natural sciences 
employ the hypothetico-deductive method, the arts use the hermeneutic method and the social 
sciences rely on the dialectical method. Elster disagrees: 
                                              
2 At a different level, in management practice, this problem can be seen to exist in a very similar way in common 
expressions such as “you can only manage what you can measure” and “if you don’t measure it, it won’t improve”.  
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“The hypothetico-deductive method is the  method for verification in all empirical 
sciences. If the hermeneutic method is understood as a procedure for verification, it can 
only be a sub-species of the hypothetico-deductive method. To be precise, the 
hermeneutic method is the hypothetico-deductive method applied to intentional 
phenomena, with some peculiar features due to the nature of these phenomena” (Elster, 
1983, pp. 15-16). 
According to Elster, the right distinction is the one between three modes of explanation: 
causal, functional, and intentional. The mode of explanation will then (partly) determine the 
appropriate method. “Causal explanation is the unique mode of explanation in physics, and 
physics is the standard instance and model of science using causal explanation. (...) 
Functional explanation involves such notions as benefits, adaptation, selection and evolution. 
(...) Biology is the paradigm for functional explanation. (...) The basic building block in the 
social sciences, the elementary unit of explanation is the individual action guided by some 
intention. (...) Intentional adaptation differs from functional in that the former can be directed 
to the distant future, whereas the latter is typically myopic and opportunistic” (Elster, 1983, 
Introduction to part 1). This view is summarized in Table 1, adapted from Elster. The two 
“Yes, but…” answers in the causal row for biological and social sciences have to do with the 
possibility of invoking causal explanations in these sciences. If we restrict ourselves to the 
social sciences, Elster’s analysis is that they have sub-intentional and supra-intentional 
causal explanations. Sub-intentional causal explanations occur in “mental operations that are 
not governed by will or intention, but – metaphorically speaking – take place ‘behind the 
back’ of the individual concerned. Supra-intentional causality refers to the causal interaction 
between intentional actors” (1983, p. 20). 
Table 1 
Mode of Explanation  Physical Sciences  Biological Sciences  Social Sciences 
Causal  Yes  Yes, but…  Yes, but… 
Functional No  Yes  No 
Intentional No  No  Yes 
 
Unfortunately, management theories at present are “overwhelmingly causal or functional in 
their modes of explanation” (Ghoshal, 2005). Elster (1983) goes even further and denies that 
functional explanations have any role in the social sciences, relating intentionality with 
rationality. Intentional behavior is behavior related to the future (perhaps to the long run) by 
individuals who are willing to sacrifice short-term satisfaction to obtain long-term results. 
Intentional behavior also attempts to perform actions that will result in the desired outcomes 
through appropriate use of available means (rationality). 
All this seems to be particularly applicable to management. Management starts with an 
overall purpose that basically consists of gearing the organization (i.e., the people in the 
organization) towards doing whatever is necessary to achieve the desired results. For this 
purpose, organizations must ‘invest’ and sacrifice short-term satisfaction to obtain long-
term results. Therefore, theories based on intentional explanations of behavior that by its 
own nature should not be short-sighted are, according to Elster’s view, absolutely 
necessary.  
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How to go about developing such theories is far from trivial. One needs a formalized language 
that might not be available yet, which means it has to be developed. To develop this language, 
it is absolutely necessary to observe reality in such a way as to capture the essential concepts 
and their interrelationships. Christenson (1976) indicates the methodological direction to be 
taken: “There are excellent grounds for believing that Newton’s method – which will be called 
hereafter the logico-experimental method to emphasize its dual aspect – is the only method by 
which scientific knowledge can grow. (…) The construction of Newton’s model of the Solar 
System simply could not have been carried out without the availability of the language of 
rational mechanics”, but then, “a formalized language is hardly ever a theory of just one 
particular concrete system (such as the Solar System). It is rather a theory of a whole class of 
possible systems (Newtonian mechanical systems). (…) Then, the deduction from empirical 
observation of the contingent properties of a particular concrete system is an act of 
measurement on that system. (…) In short, in the logico-experimental method observational 
data are used only as the basis of specialization, not of generalization; they are used 
deductively, not inductively.” 
Naïve Rationalism 
The formalized language needed to develop a science of management therefore has to be based 
on logic and mathematics. However, some mathematical models are built for problems that are 
not intuitively related to the real world in any realistic way, and hence are not too helpful 
when applied in practice. This is partly due to the use of some specific mathematics (e.g., 
differential calculus) that condition research, making it reductionist instead of starting to create 
a formalized language specifically appropriate to the problem at hand. Or, in other words, the 
tool sometimes conditions the formalization of the problem instead of the problem itself 
determining the tool to be used. Used wisely, the mathematical model may be taken to be a first 
approximation of the real problem; but it may become very dangerous when it is readily used 
for prescription. 
Ghoshal provides an example of such reductionism: he states that the agency model is more 
widely used (at least in academic publications and in the teachings of academicians) than the 
stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997), which is a “much more sensible 
proposition” because “such a perspective cannot be elegantly modeled: Math does not exist. 
Such a theory would not readily yield sharp, testable propositions, nor would it provide simple, 
reductionist prescriptions” (Ghoshal, 2005). 
However, this quote by Ghoshal deserves further analysis, for it is in fact a composite of two 
completely different statements. One says that the math for modeling stewardship theory does 
not exist. This may or may not be true, but in any case, it is probably true that no one has ever 
attempted such a thing. The statement itself does not preclude the possibility that the math 
might be available in the future, or that part of this math already exists today. 
The second statement is completely different and can in fact be understood to mean that more 
simplistic theories yield “sharp, testable propositions” and “reductionist prescriptions”. But if 
this is true, more simplistic theories can be tested more easily than more complex ones, and 
‘reductionist prescriptions’ can be shown to be false when they fail to achieve their goal. 
These problems are related to what Christenson (1973) calls “naïve rationalism”, which in short 
consists of the position that the “aim of a scientific theory is to ‘explain’ observed phenomena”. 
As we have seen, this objective is too ambitious. In practice, this desire to explain observed  
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‘facts’ leads to constructing mathematical models that are often very complex ways of 
rationalizing what has been observed. The mathematical derivation of theories constructed out 
of casual observations is very often a naïve rationalism of this kind. Ghoshal’s critique 
obviously applies to this approach to research. 
Donaldson (2005) interprets Ghoshal’s position in a somewhat different way. According to 
Donaldson, Ghoshal is pessimistic about social-science research since it relies on very narrow 
models that are tractable for mathematical modeling. Donaldson then argues in favor of 
“social-science research” because (1) there is some scientific research that is not that narrow, 
and (2) “it is not inherent to social science that it be mathematized”. It is easy to agree with the 
first argument: again, quite obviously, the stewardship theory developed by Davis, Schoorman 
and Donaldson (1997) is a good example. 
But the second proposition deserves qualification. While the beginning of any science cannot 
by its very nature be mathematical (and, from this point of view, the beginning of the 
stewardship theory may be a specific case of this rule), it should ultimately be formulated in a 
formalized language. Therefore, whether or not a science should be mathematized should not be 
seen as two conceivable alternatives, but rather as different stages of development of this 
science. Beginnings are by necessity non-mathematical, but the end has to be ‘mathematical’ in 
the context of a formalized language. 
In fact, the logico-experimental method briefly described above starts with the construction of 
a formalized language in logico-mathematical form, which is something completely different 
from the use of complex mathematics in different areas of economics and management that has 
so often been the subject of criticism. It is often argued (naïvely, one might add) that 
mathematics cannot be used to describe and predict human activities because they have an 
irreducible element of freedom and it is therefore impossible for mathematics to represent it 
adequately. This is typically based on the intuition that human behavior has elements that go 
beyond the familiar differential calculus used in economics, which is the tool most commonly 
known to many management researchers and practitioners. More in general, when someone 
argues against the use of mathematics in a particular discipline, it is often the case that the 
mathematics that this person knows is inadequate to express the observed phenomena of this 
discipline. Therefore, this person is to some extent right. But it might be that the mathematical 
tools necessary already exist, and this person is not aware of them, or that they can be 
developed in the future. This position has illustrious antecedents in science. Helmont, a 17
th-
century scientist, was very skeptical about efforts to mathematize physics and chemistry. 
According to him, “the rules of Mathematicks or Learning by demonstration do ill square with 
nature” (Mason, 1962). The mathematics of his time, before differential calculus, was indeed a 
poor instrument for describing continuous phenomena. But the world did not have to wait too 
long to have appropriate tools to deal with them: Newton and Leibnitz developed differential 
calculus only a few years later. 
Herbert Simon’s position seems to be more realistic: 
“The social sciences, I thought, needed the same kind of rigor and the same mathematical 
underpinnings that had made the ‘hard’ sciences so brilliantly successful. I would prepare 
myself to become a mathematical social scientist. By a combination of formal training and self 
study, the latter continuing systematically well into the 1940s, I was able to gain a broad base 
of knowledge in economics and political science, together with reasonable skills in advanced 
mathematics, symbolic logic, and mathematical statistics. (...) I also made a serious study of 
graduate-level physics in order to strengthen and practice my mathematical skills and to gain  
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an intimate knowledge of what a "hard" science was like, particularly on the theoretical side. 
An unexpected by-product of the latter study has been a lifelong interest in the philosophy of 
physics and several publications on the axiomatization of classical mechanics.” (Simon, 1996) 
As stated above, the use of logic and mathematics is just a matter of creating an internally 
consistent language where the possibility of inconsistencies is minimized. Once a science has 
developed and matured, it can and should be written in just such a language, if only to attempt 
to make sure it contains no contradictions. This is particularly important in management, where 
we want to minimize the probability of holding inconsistent beliefs or intentions or of not 
perceiving their logical consequences. In the end, all sciences must be structured in such an 
internally consistent language. The use of mathematics is therefore simply inevitable. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that, at a particular point in time, any given science must be in 
a state of development that makes this possible. This would be ridiculous. Nor does it mean that 
the necessary mathematics already exists: the Helmont quote anecdote above provides an 
example of a mathematical tool that needed to be created to be able to develop mechanics 
(among other parts of physics) as an axiomatic system. In the end, everything must be formal, 
though the road to formalization may have to be informal. 
In other words, sometimes one has to start with reductionist models to be able to handle more 
complex situations. One way to make science advance is to relax the basic hypotheses of 
narrow, reductionist models so they are no longer narrow or reductionist. Alternatively, 
of course, one can start by developing informal models and theories. But to make them progress 
towards an internally consistent language, the mathematization of the theory is absolutely 
necessary at some point in time. What is clearly wrong and goes beyond naïveté is to assume 
that a reductionist model adequately represents reality, when it actually represents only a first 
approximation of the problem. And what is even worse is to draw prescriptions from such a 
reductionist model for ready application to reality. You may then end up with self-fulfilling 
prophecies that will change the behavior of people in a way that will make everybody worse off 
(Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Ferraro, Pfeffer & and Sutton, 2005). 
Agency theory is possibly one of the best examples of these phenomena, as I will attempt to 
show next. 
Agency Theory as an Example 
It is first important to clarify in our context that there are at least two different versions of 
agency theory, as was early recognized by Jensen (1983). One version is the one Jensen calls 
the “principal-agent” literature, which appeared first in journals (Ross, 1973). This version is 
mathematically structured and, thus, very precise in its assumptions and rigorous in its 
deductions, and makes it easy for anyone to see in what direction it is possible to make 
progress by relaxing assumptions. The “positive” version of the theory, which appeared in the 
literature a few years later (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), is more informal, has more verbal and 
graphical analyses, and is (supposedly) more empirical. According to Jensen (1983), they both 
attempt to “address the contracting problem between self-interested, maximizing parties and 
they both use the same agency cost minimizing tautology (although not necessarily stated in 
that form).” 
However, precisely because of the nature of these two versions, the differences between them 
are also substantial. Because of its precise, mathematized formulation, the “principal-agent 
literature” can be considered a ‘first approximation’ to the study of the problem of the  
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hierarchical relationship, which will obviously need to be further refined by additional research, 
mainly by relaxing its admittedly simplistic behavioral assumptions. The “empirical” version, in 
contrast, which purports to be descriptive of reality, has practically the same reductionist 
behavioral assumptions built into the model, but its purported empiricism makes it more likely 
for the model to be used to draw prescriptions for practical applications when analyzing 
specific situations. If this happens, the danger of having self-fulfilling prophecies of the kind 
mentioned above is in close proximity. 
In fact, both versions start (very explicitly in one case and somewhat more implicitly in the 
other) from the classical assumptions of economic theory that can be summarized in the 
concept of homo œconomicus for both the principal and the agent. Homo œconomicus is a 
rational being with perfect knowledge of his own tastes, and who is capable of making a 
decision consistent with them. These tastes are, of course, consistent themselves in the sense of 
not being contradictory and being transitive (i.e., if John prefers A to B and B to C, then he also 
prefers A to C), but otherwise perfectly arbitrary (i.e., there is no reason why John should prefer 
A to B or B to A, except due to his own tastes). 
Unbounded rationality is a crucial and often implicit assumption. If individuals can be perfectly 
aware of their own tastes, and hence to choose in a way that maximizes their utility, then there 
is no place for some common practices in the world of management such as goal-setting and 
persuasion, since maximizing agents will not accept anything but the best. And there will be 
very limited room for learning and negotiation. The only form of learning possible in a world 
of unbounded rationality is the Bayesian sense of updating probabilistic beliefs about uncertain 
variables when new information is gained. Other kinds of learning are excluded, such as an 
awareness of changes in agents’ attitudes towards each other or of changes in their conceptions 
of how much they initially thought they would like the results of their actions (Rosanas, 2007). 
In the standard version of agency theory, the arguments of both utility functions (the 
principal’s and the agent’s) are essentially monetary values. However, starting rather early on, 
some principal-agent models included disutility for effort on the part of the agent as well (i.e., 
an ‘effort’ variable of which utility is a decreasing function and ‘results’ an increasing 
function). Later, more sophisticated models attempted to include other variables, but the extent 
to which they achieved it within the formal model was rather limited. Variables like 
‘identification’ and ‘loyalty’, which are much earlier considered in ‘rational’ approaches to 
organizations, such as that of Simon (1947), or ‘caring for other people’s welfare’ and ‘pro-
social preferences’ (Osterloh and Frey, 2003), are unknown in the agency literature. 
Human beings interpreted as utility functions can be considered a ‘mechanical’ model, but at 
the same time, their utility represents their intentions. Thus, agency theory (like the rest of 
organizational economics) can be seen as an attempt to simultaneously produce Elster’s ‘causal’ 
and ‘intentional’ explanations (Elster, 1983). In fact, unbounded rationality, paradoxically 
perhaps, makes human beings so intentionally calculative (taking into account the very long 
run as easily as the short run) that their behavior becomes perfectly foreseeable or ‘mechanical’ 
and, thus, explanations may become ‘causal’. Bounded rationality makes individuals subject to 
different stimuli depending on specific circumstances and makes their behavior ‘non-
mechanical’. With unbounded rationality, the long run is anticipated just as clearly as the short 
run, as if everything happened in an instant. Bounded rationality, in contrast, can make causal 
and intentional explanations substantially different. Sacrificing something today for something 
else that you are going to obtain in the distant future (i.e., investing) calls for strong intentions 
and rationality (bounded rationality, of course). Learning about one’s own real satisfaction with 
different outcomes, so that the investments to be made in the future are only the ones that are  
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‘worth’ the short-run sacrifice, and learning about the whole decision-making process become 
crucial to explain the future behavior of rational agents. 
The conventional agency models can try (partly, at least) to accommodate these types of 
learning and the desire for other variables by relaxing some of the initial assumptions. In fact, 
within the formalized framework of the principal-agent model, the developments of the last few 
years have gone in the direction of making assumptions more realistic from the point of view 
of those variables that are missing (Gibbons, 1998). There is nothing wrong with this and it 
may be the way to progress in science: building more realistic models where more variables are 
included. 
The real problem is not the assumptions and the necessarily incomplete analysis, but the 
conclusions and the eagerness for premature practical application. If in physics we build a 
simplified model based on unrealistic assumptions and then keep adding more variables to 
make it more realistic, this does not change the behavior of the entities under study. Therefore, 
our model will become more and more complete. But as Ghoshal and Moran (1996) and Ferraro, 
Pfeffer and Sutton (2005) have shown, using models based on pessimistic assumptions about 
human nature to obtain recommendations for management practice may become and often do 
change their behavior, thus leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy for these assumptions, which 
then become ‘realistic,’ when they initially were not. 
Naïve Empiricism 
The next danger in management research is naïve empiricism. Naïve empiricism consists of 
believing that “for a statement to be scientifically meaningful, it must be logically constructible 
out of terms which refer to immediate experience. (…) This is sometimes expressed by saying 
that the atomic constituents of a scientific theory are ‘fact statements.’ (…) But the concept of 
‘fact’ is a much more complex one than a naïve empiricist is willing to admit” (Christenson, 
1973; see, also, Quine, 1953). 
Plain, unprejudiced facts simply do not exist (Chalmers, 1976; Elster, 1983). Elster states it very 
clearly: “It is generally accepted that in science there is no ‘theory-neutral’ observation 
language. When engaged in deriving observational consequences from a theory to be tested, 
one always has to take for granted the validity of other theories that enter into the construction 
of the observation language. The apparently simple notion of a temperature reading embodies a 
vast amount of theoretical assumptions.” (p. 237, note 1) Obviously, things will not be any 
easier in management. 
Hayek (1974) warns against the use of some empirical methods: 
“...what looks superficially like the most scientific procedure is often the most 
unscientific, and, beyond this, in these fields (the social sciences) there are definite limits 
to what we can expect science to achieve. (...) the confidence in the unlimited power of 
science is only too often based on a false belief that the scientific method consists in the 
application of a ready-made technique, or in imitating the form rather than the substance 
of scientific procedure, as if one needed only to follow some cooking recipes to solve all 
social problems. It sometimes almost seems as if the techniques of science were more 
easily learnt than the thinking that shows us what the problems are and how to approach 
them.”  
12 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
A very common view of science is that it starts from unbiased observation of facts and then 
generalizes, by induction, to formulate universal laws about those facts that are generalized in 
subsequent steps to build theories of a more general nature. These laws and theories are then 
verified by comparing their empirical consequences with reality, including the initial 
observations. According to Mark Blaug (1980), this view (in practice identical to “naive 
empiricism”) was the standard view of the philosophy of science in the mid-19
th century. And 
yet, as early on as the end of the 18
th century, Kant and Hume had shown that this conception 
did not hold water; and, in the 20
th century, practically all developments in the philosophy of 
science, from logical positivism to Popper and from Kuhn to Lakatos, dismiss this type 
of approach. It is a sad fact of human nature that a point of view can survive (and not only 
until the mid-19
th century, but on into the 21
st, though it is less widespread) even after it has 
repeatedly been shown to be ill-founded. 
Naïve empiricism is possibly one of the greatest dangers to the development of a science of 
management because it produces an army of researchers looking for aseptic ‘facts’ and 
‘empirical truths’ where there are none. Empirical research obviously has an important role in 
the development of science, but not the one that is often believed. 
After being very critical of naïve empiricism, Christenson states that there is another kind of 
empiricism, which he calls “sophisticated” empiricism, that is potentially very useful. A 
sophisticated empiricist first checks a theory for internal contradictions and contradictions with 
known ‘facts’. Then a sophisticated empiricist tries to produce ‘facts’ that contradict the theory 
(i.e., that falsify the theory) and lets the facts decide. 
In more technical words, the rationalized language that is the basis of science describes a 
variety of systems that are logically possible. In the context of such a language, empirical 
observations attempt to determine which conceivable system we are observing. This is the role 
of empirical research (Christenson, 1976). 
Falsification and Common Sense in Management Theory 
Falsification is thus a crucial concept. And it has already been argued that the hypothetico-
deductive method is the only method for theory verification in all the empirical sciences. It 
essentially consists of developing a set of logically consistent, universal, falsifiable (i.e., that 
can empirically be proven false) statements and their logical consequences, and then to look for 
facts that contradict (i.e., falsify) such a theory. A statement that is falsifiable and has not been 
falsified after some serious attempts to do so is then accepted as scientific. This is always 
provisional, since new facts might appear to falsify it. This demarcation principle (i.e., the 
principle that separates the scientific from the unscientific) originates in the writings of Karl 
Popper and is widely accepted today by philosophers of science
3. But it is sometimes seen as if 
it were a straitjacket on the social sciences, when in fact it is not. 
Ghoshal, for instance (2005), on the one hand begins his paper by accepting the “common 
view” that considers “management-related theories as part of the social science”, and then 
carefully analyzes Elster’s distinction between the three types of explanation (causal, functional 
                                              
3 Incidentally, Popper’s falsification criterion is a significant departure from the verificationist position of logical 
positivism, one of the two basic tenets of that school (the other one being logical analysis). Logical positivism 
demands verification of a given proposition as a criterion for considering it scientific, while Popper proposes only 
falsifiability (i.e., the possibility of an experiment proving the statement wrong), essentially because in his view 
(which is now widely accepted), verification of positive, universal propositions is logically impossible.  
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and intentional) and strongly argues (with Elster) that the social sciences basically have to rely 
on intentional explanations. This is hardly disputable, although it is inconsistent with a vast 
proportion of today’s management research, which at best shoots for functional explanations. 
But on the other, Ghoshal makes strong statements that may not be altogether compatible with 
this initial view. He states that, 
“Scholarship of common sense is the epistemology of disciplined imagination as 
advocated by Karl Weick (1989), and not the epistemology of formalized falsification that 
was the doctrine of Karl Popper (1968)” (p. 81). 
He provides no reason for making this statement or for arguing that “common sense” and 
“falsification” are mutually incompatible. “Disciplined imagination” is probably a very good 
basis for “theory construction”, which is the basic point of Weick’s article (as suggested by its 
title), but this is by no means in contradiction with falsification, which is a part of the 
hypothetico-deductive model and thus a much better basis for theory verification (indeed, as we 
have seen, it is the only one according to both Popper and Elster). Thus, disciplined imagination 
and falsification can be seen as complements rather than competitors. 
Later on, Ghoshal states that, 
“...the trouble in the social sciences is that the logic of falsification, which is so very 
essential for the epistemology of positivism, is very hard to apply with any degree of 
rigor and ruthlessness in the domain of social theories. Typically, no theory - which are 
all, by definition, partial - explains a ‘phenomenon of organized complexity’ fully, and 
many different and mutually inconsistent theories explain the same phenomenon, often 
to very similar extents” (p. 86). 
The second part of the above quote is true, but the first part is an often-defended position 
without foundation. Theories are by definition partial and none can “fully explain” any kind 
of phenomena. As stated above, explanation is in general too ambitious an aspiration for a 
theory. But in the logic of Popper, a statement or a whole set of logically interconnected 
statements can have scientific status even if they are not falsifiable, provided there exist some 
logical consequences of these statements that are falsifiable. This is, indeed, a very reasonable 
demand. When a statement cannot be falsified and its logical consequences cannot be 
falsified either, it may be a very respectable belief, but it is difficult to grant it scientific 
status. The complexity of the problem is irrelevant to that purpose. In fact, there is no reason 
why falsification should be more difficult to apply in the social sciences than it is in the 
natural sciences. It is true that all theories are, by definition, partial, but the possible fear that 
the straightforward application of falsification will prove all theories “wrong” or “false” is 
just as justified in the social sciences as in the natural sciences. Surely, “organized 
complexity” does not make things any easier, but there is no reason to believe it makes them 
impossible. In both the social and the natural sciences there are always competing, 
incompatible theories that explain the same phenomena and there is nothing wrong with that. 
The Ptolemaic theory of astronomy, for instance, explained everything that happened in the 
sky very well, just as the Copernican-Galilean-Newtonian theory does, and they are 
incompatible. The latter is much simpler, easier to understand and use, and does not call for 
ad-hoc explanations for any new phenomena observed, which are the basic reasons it came to 
be accepted as a ‘better’ explanation. Incidentally, the Copernican-Galilean-Newtonian theory 
does not provide a very good explanation of the phenomena observed when masses reach 
speeds close to the speed of light; the theory of relativity is needed in such cases. Newtonian  
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mechanics and the theory of relativity coexist in any good physics and engineering 
curriculum, even though the latter proves the former ‘false’. But it is an approximation that is 
good enough for most practical purposes (including sending rockets to the moon). 
Donaldson (2005) disagrees with Ghoshal when he argues for “common sense” as the basis of 
science. He rightly provides an example of how historically, even in the hard sciences, 
progress has often meant a fight against the “common-sense view”, which sometimes cannot 
go beyond very simple, intuitive ideas that seem to be “right” but are not. Just to stress this 
point, it is clear that the model that has been (and possibly still is) the most successful in 
history, i.e., Newtonian mechanics, is based on three “axioms”
4 or principles that are 
counterintuitive to the layman; and yet the concepts of Aristotelian physics that it replaced 
are full of “common sense”. There resides, perhaps, the greatest part of Newton’s credit. Using 
“common sense” as the only criterion would have meant dismissing the most successful 
model in the history of science as “unscientific”. 
O f  c o u r s e ,  a l l  t h i s  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  c o m m o n  s e n s e  s h o u l d  p l a y  n o  r o l e  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  
sciences, or that there is no common sense in research. For one thing, many of the traps 
discussed in this article are fairly obvious with a little bit of common sense. But researchers 
sometimes get carried away with their standard methods and forget about the basic nature of 
the problem. In any case, the role played by common sense cannot be reduced to that. In all 
sciences, common sense must play a role that comes before (and, at the same time, goes 
beyond) strict model-building. Good theory grows out of practice (Christenson, 1973; 1976) 
and good practice is not possible without common sense. Christenson quotes Pareto (1935) 
and says that “the dyer’s art was more safely entrusted to the dyer who knew his trade by 
rule of thumb than to alchemists who played with the theoretical lucubrations of magic and 
other such nonsense”. 
In other words, dyers were quite successful in their trade in the Middle Ages because they 
used their experience and common sense, and this put them far ahead of chemistry, which 
was in its pre-scientific stage of alchemy. It has only been through the interaction of good 
practice and scientific development that good theories have grown. 
Naïve Pragmatism 
A very serious consequence of the two forms of “naïveté” briefly described above is that 
both practitioners and practical-minded academicians, disappointed with the pretended 
scientific rigor of something they do not understand and that does not offer guarantees 
that it works (unrealistic formal models that aim to describe reality, alleged empirical 
evidence that is in fact worse than a half-truth), turn to knowledge coming directly from 
practice (or common sense) without the necessary guarantees that could make this 
knowledge solidly founded and really useful. And academicians complain about 
practitioners do not use what they have to offer. The controversies in the articles cited 
above (i.e.,
 Van de Ven and Johnson, 2006; McKelvey, 2006) go along these lines. This is 
a third type of “naïveté”: naïve pragmatism. According to Christenson (1973), naïve 
pragmatism is the idea that scientific knowledge should be immediately ‘useful’, possibly 
coming directly from experience, and “therefore the sooner it is used, the better”. The 
‘common-sense idea’ that experience, directly and without further reflection, provides 
‘facts’ on which one can base practical knowledge is at the same time naïve pragmatism 
                                              
4 Principle of inertia, principle of action and reaction, and f=m.a, m being a constant independent of v.  
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and naïve empiricism. A theoretical structure is needed to avoid falling into that double 
trap. That is unfortunately what happens in many of the best-selling books on 
management, which are typically written by non-academicians looking for direct recipes 
based on so-called ‘facts’. 
As the usual argument goes, they choose ‘relevance’ as opposed to ‘rigor’. The contrast 
between the two concepts is in itself absurd: knowledge that is not ‘rigorous’ can never be 
‘relevant’. Rigor is only the minimum assurance that the knowledge is genuine, coming 
from experience, but with guarantees (a theoretical structure and some conditions on the 
observation process) that it is not fake knowledge or superstition. If we have no solid 
basis to declare that some knowledge is ‘true’, then this knowledge is extremely 
dangerous, no matter how successful some applications of it have been. A little 
knowledge is always a dangerous thing. Unfortunately again, the ‘rigor’ that is often 
challenged as being the cause of irrelevance, instead of ‘rigor,’ is in fact adherence to 
specific research methods that, to paraphrase the Hayek quote above, are decidedly 
unscientific in the true sense of the word. 
To illustrate this point further, it is good idea to remember what Galileo Galilei (1665) had 
to say about his observations at the Arsenal of Venice. In his “Dialog Concerning Two 
New Sciences”, the character that represents Galileo himself (Salviati) and the intelligent 
layman accompanying him (Sagredo), discuss how interesting it was to go to the Venice 
Arsenal “for the mere pleasure of observing the work of those who, on account of their 
superiority over other artisans, are called first-rank men.” He thought that the 
instruments and machines being constructed there were so good that “there must be some 
(artisans) who, partly by inherited experience and partly by their own observations, have 
become highly expert and clever in explanation”. But sometimes, when they are asked 
questions about why they do something, the reason they give is not a good one (e.g., the 
reasons for employing stock, scaffolding and bracing of proportionally larger dimensions 
for launching big vessels than for launching smaller ones). “The common opinion is here 
absolutely wrong,” says Salviati. In other words, Galileo shows (rightly, we know today) 
that the artisans in fact did the right thing (otherwise, one might add, the vessel would 
not have worked), but they were doing it for the wrong reason. Their ‘common sense’, 
acquired through their own and inherited experience, allowed them to do what was right, 
but did not tell them the real reason behind their practice (Galilei, 1665, First Day). 
Finding the right ‘whys’ is the role of the academician, but this has to be done in contact 
with good practice, not against it. 
Admittedly, in the social sciences in general and in management in particular, everything 
is more complex than in the natural sciences because (i) it is more difficult to recognize 
when a practice ‘works’ and when it does not, and (ii) it is more difficult to know exactly 
what is desired as a result (e.g., shareholder-value maximization or broader goals). In fact, 
these are the main problems with the so-called ‘evidence-based management’ approach: 
knowing when something works or not, and knowing when the results are good or bad. 
And that is why a methodological reflection and debate on what we are doing today in 
management research is indispensable.  
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Summary and Conclusions 
There are all kinds of methodological problems in the social sciences in general, and in 
management in particular. These problems have been overlooked for a number of years, but 
now seem to have sparked people’s interest. Unfortunately, there is a wide gap between the 
philosophy of science and management, where scholars in the two fields are often incapable of 
understanding each other. The issues raised by Ghoshal (2005), Rousseau (2006), Smith and Hitt 
(2005) and others should be the starting point of a better understanding of the methodological 
issues and a review of the accepted research methods in light of sound methodology. 
The main objective of this paper is to contribute towards applying the essential concepts of the 
philosophy of science to management. To do so, I started by trying to distinguish between a 
sound concept of science and the intuitive, simplistic view of it as applied to management, 
which often consists of scientism rather than science. Then I examined some epistemological 
problems in economics (which is often taken today as the paradigm of social science) and, from 
there, the epistemological problems of a science of management. The role of mathematics and 
formal models were discussed, and the naïve, extreme views of rationalism, empiricism 
and pragmatism analyzed. Finally, I discussed the role of common sense and practice in the 
growth of a sound theory of management.  
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